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The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements 
 
 
Robert Anderson† and Jeffrey Manns††    
Abstract 
                                 
Transactional law is one of the most economically significant areas of legal 
practice and accounts for a large percentage of the profits and staffing at most elite law 
firms.  But in spite of its economic importance, there has been almost no empirical work 
on the legal drafting process and the evolution of transactional documents over time.  We 
have sought to fill this gap by analyzing the evolution of public company merger 
agreements in a dataset that encompasses 12,000 merger agreements over a 20-year 
period.  Using computer textual analysis, we are able to identify the precedent, an earlier 
merger agreement, which serves as the template for the drafting of each deal.  This 
approach allows us to construct comprehensive “family trees” of merger agreements, 
which we use to show how agreements are created and how they change over time.  
 
We use this innovative approach to explore whether transactional drafting is 
driven by a rational process that minimizes the cost of deal documentation and risk to 
clients or by an ad hoc process that increases billable hours and risk.  We show that a 
high level of “editorial churning,” ad hoc edits that appear to be cosmetic rather than 
substantive, takes place in legal drafting.  Over half of the text of merger agreements is 
routinely rewritten during the drafting process even though the substantive provisions of 
merger agreements have similar features.  Significant variation exists among merger 
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agreements even involving the same firm as there is no evidence of firm-specific 
templates or industry-specific templates in most cases.  Lawyers appear to choose earlier 
merger agreements as deal templates based on familiarity with past deals rather than 
based on the economic needs of clients or cost mitigation.  Our empirical findings 
provide strong evidence of significant (structural) inefficiency in the drafting process 
which raises costs and risk to clients.   
 
We argue that this inefficiency calls for an industry-wide solution of creating 
standardized templates for merger agreements that could be used across firms.  The use 
of standardized documentation would help to minimize the time consuming (and 
expensive) drafting process of lawyer- and firm-specific edits that do little, if anything, to 
protect clients or affect the substance of the transaction.  Furthermore, deal term 
standardization would have positive externalities as judicial opinions crystalize the 
meaning of standardized text. In addition, our analysis suggests that, somewhat 
counterintuitively, the failure to standardize text actually may stifle true innovation in the 
transactional context. We argue that by establishing an industry-wide set of “base 
documents,” lawyers could create the technological platform on which to create truly 
innovative solutions for clients at lower cost.  While lawyers may not have the self-
interest to embrace a standardized set of documents on their own, we argue that repeat-
player private equity firms or trade associations for the private equity industry may have 
the economic interest and leverage to push for greater standardization.   
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Introduction       
Transactional law accounts for approximately 32% of the revenue of Am Law 50 
firms, nearly as much as litigation,1  and is an outsized driver of profitability and prestige 
for elite firms.2  Transactional lawyers draft the terms contained in documents that 
delineate the rights and duties for trillions of dollars of transfers every year.3  This work 
product has potentially staggering importance as the legally operative terms in these 
agreements have the potential to meet or frustrate the economic motivations of enormous 
transfers of capital in the United States and world economy.        
      
In spite of its economic importance, there has been almost no empirical work on 
the legal drafting process in transactional law.4  Most articles about transactional drafting 
either deal with pedagogical issues in teaching legal drafting or with specific substantive 
aspects of law.5  In contrast, the process by which transactional lawyers draft documents 
that shape capital flows of trillions of dollars remains almost completely unstudied.6   
                                                            
   1 See, e.g., John Wilmouth, Citi Report: M&A Work Boosts Firm Profitability in 2014, AMERICAN 
LAWYER, available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202717444629/Citi-Report-MA-Work-Boosts-
Firm-Profitability-in-2014-#ixzz3eN20cBf5 (discussing how Am Law 50 firms have significantly 
outperformed other firms in profitability growth due to their greater reliance on mergers and acquisitions 
work for revenue); see also Georgetown Law Center for the Study of the Legal Profession, 2015 Report on 
the State of the Legal Market, at 4 Chart 2, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-
institutes/legal-profession/upload/FINAL-Report-1-7-15.pdf (documenting how transactional law has been 
a driver of law firm growth).       
  2 See https://peermonitor.thomsonreuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Transaction-Practices-
Spotlight_2015.pdf. 
   3  See, e.g., Maureen Farrell, 2015 Becomes the Biggest M&A Year Ever, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2015 
(discussing how global mergers and acquisitions surpassed $4.3 trillion in 2015).   
   4 There have been many studies of specific deal terms, such as MAC Clauses. See, e.g., Talley & O’Kane, 
The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A 
Agreements, 168 J. INST. & TH. ECON. 181 (2012); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and 
Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755 (2009). However, most studies do not address 
transactional practice overall, but specific provisions within that practice.   
   5 See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination 
Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1165–67, 1175, 1181 (2010) (discussing attempts at reallocating deal risks 
through reverse termination fees that compensate target companies should the buyer walk away and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
assessing the impact such attempts have on acquisition agreement drafting); William T. Allen, 
Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653, 
657–60 (2000) (discussing the role of fiduciary outs in providing an “escape hatch” to targets to consider 
unsolicited higher offers from third-party bidders); Thomas W. Bates & Michael L. Lemmon, Breaking Up 
is Hard to Do? An Analysis of Termination Fee Provisions and Merger Outcomes, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 
472, 484–86, 494 (2003) (arguing that deals with target termination fees entail greater premiums for target 
shareholder and higher completion rates than deals without such provisions); Albert Choi & George 
Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 
853–61, 889–91 (2010) (arguing that before closing the deal, the intentional vagueness of MAC clauses 
create more efficient incentives for the seller than more precise and less costly proxies); Yair Y. Galil, 
MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846, 850–851 
(discussing how unclear judicial interpretations of the contours of material adverse change clauses (MAC) 
and material adverse effect clauses (MAE) cast a shadow over merger deals); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan 
Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 340–345 
(2005) (using economic modeling to analyze the role that MAC and MAE clauses play in the structure of 
the standard acquisition agreement and the incentive effects for acquirers and targets); Sean J. Griffith, 
Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1905–06, 1963–70 
(2003) [hereinafter Griffith, Deal Protection] (discussing the significance of Delaware’s judicially created 
limitations on deal protection provisions meant to resolve the conflicting incentives of the acquirer’s and 
target’s management when facing last-minute, third-party bids); Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 192, 197–208 
(2009) (arguing that the legal terms in acquisition agreements are intentionally ambiguous in order to deter 
litigation and incentivize negotiators to close the deal); Robert T. Miller, Canceling the Deal: Two Models 
of Material Adverse Change Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 108–
111 (2009) (advocating a judicial framework for interpreting MAC clauses that places the burden of 
material changes on targets and the burden of immaterial changes on acquirers during the closing period); 
Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business 
Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2013–14 (2009) [hereinafter Miller, Deal Risk] 
(arguing that the reciprocal allocations of deal risk in MAC clauses serve to further efficiency in 
transactions by decreasing the likelihood that parties will exercise termination rights); Brian JM Quinn, 
Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 792–94, 826–28 (2010) (arguing that reverse 
termination fees that are equal in size to termination fees inefficiently leave targets exposed to more risk 
from exogenous events);  Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 55, 60, 96–105 (2010) (advocating contractual limits on fiduciary outs to allow target 
company mangers to sidestep fiduciary duties to make merger recommendations on third-party bids during 
the closing period); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 
940–941 (2010) (arguing for interpretative default rules in construing Material Adverse Change clauses); 
Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the Material Adverse 
Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 817–823 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz, Standard Clause] (arguing 
that MAC clauses transform conventional default rules by (1) allowing a contractual exit in cases of 
frustration of secondary purposes or partial loss of value and (2) shifting exogenous risk from the acquirer 
to the target); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
755, 760–63 (2009) (arguing that Material Adverse Event clauses are a tool for allocating the risk of market 
uncertainty present while negotiating the acquisition agreement).  
    6 One notable exception is Ronald Gilson’s seminal article on the value-added from transactional 
lawyers, which focused attention on the constructive role of transactional lawyers.  See, e.g., Ronald J. 
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243, 254–
55 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation] (observing that “the academic literature assume[s] that 
business lawyers increase the value of a transaction” and arguing that M&A lawyers add value by 
designing provisions in acquisition agreements that reduce transaction costs and increase mutual gain); see 
also Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 
487–88, 506–07 (2007) (using survey data from transactional lawyers and their clients to argue that lawyers 
add value to transactions primarily by reducing regulatory costs through legal expertise rather than more 
broadly reducing transactions costs or adding reputational value).   
We have sought to fill this gap by analyzing the evolution of public company 
merger agreements in a dataset that encompasses 12,000 merger agreements over a 20-
year period.  Using computer textual analysis, we are able to identify the precedent, an 
earlier merger agreement, which serves as the template for the drafting of each deal.7   
This approach allows us to construct comprehensive “family trees” of merger 
agreements, which we use to show how agreements are created and how they change 
over time.  
 
We use this innovative approach to explore whether transactional drafting is 
driven by a rational process that minimizes the cost of deal documentation and risk to 
clients or by an ad hoc process that increases billable hours and risk.  We show that a 
high level of “editorial churning,” unnecessary and ad hoc edits that appear to be 
cosmetic rather than substantive, takes place in legal drafting. This churning appears to 
go far beyond the necessary deal-specific edits,8 with over half of the text of merger 
agreements are routinely rewritten even though the substantive provisions of merger 
agreements have similar features.   
 
We show that public merger agreement terms are not based off a common “form” 
agreement, but rather are the product of an “evolution” over many generations. This is 
true even within large law firms, where drafts are based on prior agreements rather than 
standardized form language. The absence of even firm-specific forms has led to 
                                                            
    7 See, e.g., TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 335-
36 (2007) (discussing the benefits of heightened efficiency and legal certainty from precedent-based legal 
drafting). 
   8 See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of 
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 277 (1990) (discussing the tradeoffs between standardization 
and customization in contractual drafting).   
haphazard and inconsistent lawyering as lawyers add significant amounts of extraneous 
information to each deal and inadvertently retain deal-specific information from prior 
deals.  This fact underscores the inefficiency of current deal drafting processes and 
undercuts the argument that merger agreements are distinctively crafted (at great 
expense!) to suit the needs of clients.   
 
We argue that the remarkable heterogeneity of acquisition agreements reflects 
lawyers’ tendency to use precedents that they are more familiar with or relate to the 
particular client they are dealing with, rather than those that may be more readily adapted 
to the transaction at hand.  The result is a path dependent process of deal term evolution 
that thwarts standardization even within firms and leads to systematic inefficiencies in the 
acquisition agreement drafting process which raises costs and risk to clients.   
 
The high degree of drafting inefficiency suggests the desirability of a transition to 
greater standardization of acquisition agreements,9 and we provide an approach that could 
assist that process.  Our technique enables drafters to see the edits that have been made 
over the past few generations of a draft lineage, allowing them to more easily reverse 
non-standardized text embedded in a precedent document. This approach would help to 
transform acquisition agreements from opaque, byzantine documents into easily 
comparable agreements that would entail lower cost to produce and would create higher 
legal certainty.  We suggest how private equity firms (or trade associations representing 
                                                            
   9 See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 2002 
58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1431-1438 (2009) (providing an overview of the benefits of standardization for 
contracting).       
the private equity industry) could take the lead in the standardization process based on 
their repeat player interaction with law firms.     
    
Although we focus on the public company merger context, our argument may 
extend to a far broader spectrum of transactional contexts.  If there is evidence of 
systematic inefficiency in the merger agreement context where there is transparency of 
the end product, we would expect there is an even greater risk of an absence of 
standardization and editorial churning in other transactional contexts where there is little 
to no transparency of the deal documents.10  Deal lawyers face a paradox – 
standardization reduces transaction costs and thus helps their clients, but also may cut 
into the bottom line of their firm’s revenues.11 We argue that just as merger agreement 
standardization may allow transactional lawyers to focus on where they can add value to 
a merger or acquisition that the same logic applies in other transactional contexts.  But a 
similar challenge exists across transactional law as lawyers have every temptation to stick 
with the lucrative status quo unless clients themselves push for greater standardization 
across the spectrum of transactional law contexts.12   
     
                                                            
   10 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions Into the Law School Classroom, 
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475, 485-486 (2002) (discussing the lack of transparency concerning most 
corporate law documents).    
   11 See, e.g., Maurits Dolmans, Standards for Standards, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 163, 166 (discussing how 
standardization reduces barriers to entry). 
   12 See, e.g,, Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 289-93 (discussing how the focus of transactional 
lawyers is often on upholding their reputations); Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson, The Merger 
Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1173-74 (2013) (discussing how much of the perceived value-
added from M&A lawyers appears to be from their reputational intermediary role and due diligence 
function); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
260 n.279 (2009) (discussing the significance of the role of transactional lawyers as “reputational 
intermediaries”).       
We organize this paper by first describing in Part I the background to 
transactional practice that is necessary to understand the approach we take. Next, in Part 
II we will describe our dataset of merger agreements. In Part III we will demonstrate that 
in contrast to the degree of standardization or convergence we expected to see, we find an 
incredible degree of variety in the agreements studied.        
 
In Part IV, we will create several “phylogenetic trees” of the set of merger 
agreements, showing how agreements have evolved over time. We find clear evidence 
that in most cases there are no standardized “forms,” but rather “lineages” of agreements 
that drift rapidly from their original forms. In Part V, we will explain why the agreements 
have evolved in this way. We show that it is predominantly prior firm connection, rather 
than similarity of the deals, that drives precedent selection.  We also discuss the problems 
associated with the random drift of deal documents. The lack of standardization makes 
agreements more costly and difficult to interpret, it results in less case law and therefore 
more uncertain legal outcomes. In Part VI, we will offer some steps toward solutions that 
will better integrate legal practice with the needs of modern capital markets. 
               
I.  Transactional Practice Background 
The deal drafting process has been all but ignored by legal scholars.  This issue is 
not limited to mergers and acquisitions as legal scholarship has explored remarkably little 
about the deal drafting process.13  Most corporate law professors’ understanding of deal 
                                                            
   13  The seminal article on legal drafting is Ronald Gilson’s article on the value added by transactional 
lawyers. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 254–55.  But Gilson’s work and others who have 
written on transactional law have largely overlooked the legal drafting process, and instead have focused on 
making appears formed by their own idiosyncratic experience in practice in corporate law 
that was shaped by the law firm they worked for as well as the partners and associates 
they worked with.  The emphasis is on the word idiosyncratic as even a cursory 
examination of the products of transactional law reveals the remarkable degree of 
divergence in deal design, not only from firm to firm but also from transaction to 
transaction for deals involving particular firms.  This fact raises the concern that surveys 
of lawyers or other more anecdotal ways of gathering information about the deal making 
process would fail to capture what is actually happening in deal making across firms.              
       
The dearth of academic research on legal drafting is so severe that little is known 
about where deal documents come from beyond the rudimentary insight that transactional 
lawyers start off with precedents from past deals as a template for the new deal.  Even 
less is known about how deal documents evolve over time and who shapes the de facto 
standard setting process.  The stakes are high as developing a better understanding of 
how deal terms develop and diverge in different areas of transactional law is key to 
creating incentives for greater standardization and reducing inefficiency, so that lawyers 
can focus on truly adding value for their clients.              
 
For this reason we seek to step back from individual lawyers’ perspectives and 
deploy quantitative techniques to compare the deal documents that lawyers produce.  Our 
study addresses a number of unanswered empirical questions concerning legal drafting.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
abstract questions of value creation, see infra note 6, or more narrow questions concerning the 
interpretation of particular merger agreement provisions.  See infra notes 4 & 5.  The irony is that the legal 
drafting process itself is at the heart of the question of value creation as inefficiencies in the drafting 
process both raise cost and as importantly distract lawyers from focusing on where they can add value to 
their clients.   
Where do the terms contained in these documents come from? How standardized are the 
terms across transactions? How does the evolution of deal documents shape their form 
and substance?  The answers to these questions have broad implications for transactional 
law scholarship, for the training of law school students and lawyers in transactional law 
practice, and for clients to assess the degree of inefficiency in transactional lawyering.   
 
To be able to assess the work product of lawyers, it is important to have an 
understanding of the goals of the transactional drafting process.  The bulk of the work in 
transactional law practice involves memorializing deal terms in documents that delineate 
the deal’s details and structure.  To create these documents, deal lawyers do not write 
new documents from scratch.14 Instead, they work from “precedents” from past deals that 
provide a template of established law and practice with provisions that reflect firm-
specific or partner-specific conventions.15 For example, lawyers representing an acquirer 
in an M&A transaction typically choose the precedent used in the deal which sets the 
defaults and baseline for negotiations among the lawyers (and their clients).16   
 
The widespread use of precedent-based drafting means that the first draft of the 
terms of virtually every deal are based upon and adapted from a prior deal, its 
“precedent.”17  This approach mitigates some of the inherent uncertainties by leveraging 
                                                            
    14 See, e.g., SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS 5-6 (2003) (discussing how 
attorneys “rarely start to draft on a blank slate … [and generally] start with an existing contract or form”). 
    15 See, e.g., TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 335-
36 (2007) (discussing the benefits of heightened efficiency and legal certainty from precedent-based legal 
drafting). 
    16  See, e.g., Scott Austin, Acquirers Back in the Game, But VCs Advised to Tread Carefully, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 29. 2009 (discussing norm for acquirers to make the first draft of the merger agreement).   
    17 See, e.g., FIONA BOYLE, DEVERAL CAPPS, PHILIP PLOWDEN, & CLARE SANFORD, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO LAWYERING SKILLS 153-154 (2012) (discussing the role of precedent in legal drafting).    
past experience and saves time and money compared to drafting from scratch.18  In each 
case, the precedent document must be adapted to the present transaction, which involves 
decustomizing the terms specifically crafted for the last transaction and recustomizing the 
terms specifically crafted for the present transaction.19 Although some decustomization is 
obvious (such as names and dates), other terms in a precedent document may appear 
generic but were actually specifically crafted for the particular situation of the precedent 
deal.          
  
The precedent-based drafting approach makes it possible to systematically study 
transactional practice. If the precedent for each deal is known, then we can study the 
changes made from deal to deal, as well as the overall evolution of the deal terms.  The 
ability to compare a document to its precedent exposes each and every edit made during 
the drafting process, offering an unparalleled view into the work that transactional 
lawyers do. The barrier to conducting this type of research is the difficulty of finding a 
complete corpus of documents and their precedents as well as the ability to trace the 
ancestry of individual documents in such a corpus.  
 
We surmount this obstacle by using documents from the one segment of 
transactional practice where almost all precedents are publicly available—public 
company mergers. Public company merger agreements offer a unique opportunity to 
                                                            
    18 See, e.g., TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 335-
36 (2007) (discussing the benefits of heightened efficiency and legal certainty from precedent-based legal 
drafting). See also Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in Legalese, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 59, 63 
(2001) (explaining why drafting from a prior agreement speeds the drafting process, increases certainty, 
and decreases cost).  
   19  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 347. 353-55 (1996) (discussing the tradeoffs from customizing agreements rather than relying on 
standard terms).     
study the evolution of transactional documents for three reasons. First, public company 
merger agreements are among the most visible and high-profile documents in all of 
transactional legal practice, and therefore reflect the investment of considerable legal 
time and attention.20 Second, we are able to construct an almost complete genealogy of 
these documents as virtually all public company merger documents are based on other 
publicly available merger documents.21 SEC disclosure rules allowed us to acquire each 
of the 12,000 public company merger agreements from 1994 to 2014, and we can put 
together a comprehensive picture of the evolution of merger agreements.22  Third, these 
documents almost always identify the law firms and lawyers who generated them, 
making it possible to trace their connection to specific firms and individuals who may 
serve as the catalysts for innovation (or for standardization).  These features allow us to 
examine the drafting work performed by transactional lawyers from one deal to the next 
and to analyze the evolution of documents both within and across law firms.   
 
 In this precedent-based drafting process, the choice of precedent becomes significant 
in setting the defaults and baselines for the negotiating process among lawyers (and their 
clients).  Generally lawyers believe that the ability to create the first draft offers an 
advantage in giving lawyers the chance to choose the precedent and shape it to meet the 
                                                            
    20  See, e.g., Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 243, 254–55 (observing that corporate acquisition 
agreements are “among the highest forms of the business lawyer's craft”).       
   21  Our dataset consists of 12,407 merger agreements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
between 1994 and 2014. We obtained this data from the Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database. See 
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/edgar_archive_indices. 
   22  See Securities & Exchange Commission, Form 8-K, Item 1.01 (requiring companies to disclose 
material definitive agreements outside of the ordinary course of business, a category which includes merger 
agreements).     
needs of the new deal.23 The convention in an M&A deal is that the acquirer’s counsel 
typically creates the first draft, which entails choosing the precedent.24 The acquirer’s 
counsel then forwards the draft to the target’s counsel, who will propose a set of changes.  
Target counsel rarely rewrite the agreement, and instead generally seek to work within 
the basic framework of the document to meet his or her client’s objectives25 as it is 
considered a breach of deal etiquette for the seller’s counsel to change the “form” of the 
agreement.26  
 
The end product is often quite different from the original precedent. But the 
fingerprints or DNA of the original document are never fully erased. This is because 
much of the idiosyncratic wording of the precedent document is retained in the final 
product, even after heavy editing. This fact allows us to recreate the entire “family tree” 
of public company merger agreements by comparing the text of the documents word-for-
word and linking precedents to their antecedents.  Because of SEC disclosure rules, we 
are able to acquire each public company merger agreement over a twenty-year period and 
can put together a comprehensive picture of the evolution of merger agreements.27            
          
                                                            
    23 See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 26-27 (1975). (discussing how the power to make the first draft gives the drafter 
leverage over other parties). 
   24 See ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: A 
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 1-27 (2010) (discussing basic strategies in drafting contracts).    
   25 See DAVID C. BURGESS ET AL., DRAFTING BUSINESS CONTRACTS §1.21 (2015) (discussing the 
limitations lawyers face in suggesting revisions to a draft).    
   26 See FREUND, supra note 20, at 28 (“Typically, the seller should live with the purchaser’s form of 
agreement, without being precluded in any way from negotiating any and all substantive matters”) 
(emphasis in original). 
   27  See Securities & Exchange Commission, Form 8-K, Item 1.01 (requiring companies to disclose 
material definitive agreements outside of the ordinary course of business, a category which includes merger 
agreements).     
Public company acquisition agreements illustrate the role of precedents.  
Acquisition agreements generally follow the broad contours of earlier agreements with 
standardized categories of provisions,
28 but they are also products of extensive 
negotiations tailored to the particulars of the transaction.
29
 Transaction-specific 
provisions identify the transaction’s structure and the timing and location of the closing,
30
  
as well as the price and payment formula for converting or buying shares.
31
                  
          
The more generic provisions include representations and warranties, contractual 
constraints on the target company during the pre-closing period, and conditions to 
closing. These provisions combine standardized provisions and highly negotiated terms.
32
  
Representations and warranties entail assertions about the target company’s business, 
balance sheets, and potential liabilities to address uncertainties uncovered in the pre-
signing due diligence review of the target.
33
  Covenants and closing conditions define the 
rights and responsibilities of the parties during the pre-closing period and the extent of 
                                                            
 28 For a broader overview of acquisition agreements, see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1563–1601 (1995).      
 29 See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 140 (1975) (“[M]ost agreements utilized in the merger and acquisition field . . . 
[include] abundant instances of nearly identical words, phrases and clauses, suggesting that respectful 
plagiarism is indeed the order of the day.”); Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 257–62, 257 n.45; 
EVAN L. GREEBEL, KEY PRIORITIES FOR BUYERS AND SELLERS IN ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
COMPANIES 2–8 (Aspatore 2011) (discussing lawyers’ focal points in negotiating merger agreements).   
 30 See THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 317 
(2009) (discussing how “the basic architecture of any acquisition agreement follows a certain convention 
regardless of deal structure”); Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 257–62 (discussing the 
standardization of the form of acquisition agreements).     
 31 See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 258–59; Lou R. Kling et al., Summary of Acquisition 
Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 781–82 (1997).   
 32 See Alyssa A. Grikscheit & Gavin D. Solotar, Key Issues in Drafting and Negotiating Acquisition 
Agreements, in DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS 183–89 (2012 Practicing Law 
Institute, PLI Order No. 34774, Jan. 25, 2012) (detailing the types of contractual constraints that parties 
face in mergers).       
   33  See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 259–60; Kling et al., supra note 13, at 781–95. 
the parties’ obligations to close the transaction. 
34
  These contractual constraints delineate 
how breach of warranties and representations, failures to satisfy conditions, or other 
circumstances that the parties agree upon can trigger walk-away rights for one or both 
parties and/or termination fees.
35  The tension in covenant and closing condition 
negotiations is that target company lawyers generally seek to heighten the certainty of 
closing,
36
 while the acquirer’s lawyers seek to preserve flexibility to withdraw or rework 
the deal if the expectations are not met.
37   
 
Law firms have traditionally emphasized the distinctiveness of their acquisition 
agreement precedents as a virtue.  This study shows how that this alleged virtue is a 
potential vice for clients as firms have failed to put together standardized agreements and 
instead rely on labor-intensive edits that churn billable hours rather than add value to 
clients.  Our study offers a first look at the significant degree of divergence in acquisition 
agreement provisions, as well as the degree to which merger negotiations lead to 
extraneous changes from deal to deal.   
                                                            
   34 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: ESSENTIALS 106–09 (2009).  Material 
Adverse Change (or Material Adverse Event) clauses specify which events entitle an acquirer to call off a 
deal if events occur between signing and closing that make the deal less advantageous than expected).  See 
Schwartz, Standard Clause, supra note 5, at 817–23.  Deal Protection provisions are designed to reduce the 
likelihood that the target board will walk away from the agreement or to require the target to compensate 
the acquiring company if the target does walk away in favor of a third-party bidder. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. 
L. REV. 239, 242–46 (1990).  
 35 See Afsharipour, supra note 5, at 1163–64, 1179–1184 (discussing MAC/MAE termination fees 
paid for by either the purchaser or seller depending on the terms of the acquisition agreement); Gilson, 
Value Creation, supra note 6, at 259–60; Kling et al., supra note 12, at 781–94; see also Choi & Triantis, 
supra note 5, at 892–93.     
 36 See Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865, 876, 
881–84. (2007) (explaining the presumed objectives of sellers’ counsel in acquisition agreement 
negotiations). 
 37 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 860–65 (arguing that in negotiations, acquirers aim to preserve 
as great a degree of flexibility as possible in order “to terminate, cancel, or be excused from [their] 
obligations”).          
 II.  The Merger Agreement Dataset 
Our dataset consists of 12,407 merger agreements filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission between 1994 and 2014. We obtained this data from the Archive 
Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database.38 A computer script was used to visit each URL 
contained in these indices and determine which filings contained exhibits labeled Exhibit 
2, which is where acquisition agreements are typically filed.39 The computer script 
collected the full text of each agreement for analysis. 
 
We refined this initial set of agreements by including only agreements whose 
titles contained the terms “merger” or “reorganization.” This refines the focus to the 
narrow category of merger agreements that are reliably filed on the EDGAR system, and  
excludes other agreement types also filed under Exhibit 2.40 The data were further curated 
to eliminate exact and near duplicates as well as very short agreements that were intra-
firm reorganizations, such as mergers to reincorporate from one state to another.41  
                                                            
   38 See Securities & Exchange Commission Edgar Database, available at http://www.sec.gov/cgi-
bin/edgar_archive_indices.   
   39 Exhibit 2 is the exhibit where merger agreements are filed, along with any other “plan of acquisition, 
reorganization, arrangement, liquidation or succession.” See 17 CFR 229.601(b)(2). Such agreements can 
also be filed under Exhibit 10, but primarily when they relate to other companies such as subsidiaries. 
   40 This approach eliminates agreement types that may overlap, such as “Contribution Agreement,” “Stock 
Purchase Agreement,” “Asset Purchase Agreement,” “Transaction Agreement,” “Share Exchange 
Agreement,” “Arrangement Agreement,” and the like. Although these agreements certainly contain 
overlapping language, we focused on documents that were clearly public company acquisition agreements. 
We also eliminated very short documents that are less than 15,000 characters because these agreements 
likely did not address the complex issues raised in larger public company acquisitions. We also excluded 
mutual holding company conversions. 
   41 Near duplicates were defined as those documents filed within 100 days of each other and having 97% 
or more similarity to one another. Most of these were the identical document, but some were amended and 
restated versions of the same document. Many of the documents contained extraneous text such as 
attachments to the main merger agreement. To remove this text, we disregarded text following the first 
occurrence (if any) of “In witness whereof,” which typically signals the end of a merger agreement. 
 With our dataset of agreements thus compiled, we used a combination of computer 
scripts and hand-coding to identify the law firms representing the acquiring company and 
the target company in each transaction.42 In addition, we collected the SIC codes for the 
company filing the agreement and the dates of the filings. 
      
The heart of our analysis is our word-for-word comparison of each agreement to each 
other agreement using the “edit distance” (also called Levenshtein distance) between 
each pair of agreements.43 When one document is copied from another, it retains 
substantial word-for-word similarity to its precedent, even after significant editing. This 
similarity is not present among documents that were not copied directly or indirectly 
from one another, even when the documents deal with identical subject matter. The 
techniques we use are similar to those used to detect plagiarism in writing,44 which can 
detect common ancestry of texts even after significant editing. 
 
To determine the similarity of the merger agreements, we used a computer program to 
compute the “edit distance” between each pair of agreements. Edit distance is an inexact 
or “fuzzy” matching approach to measuring of textual similarity or dissimilarity based on 
the number of insertions and deletions (i.e., “edits”) necessary to transform one document 
                                                            
   42 In some cases there truly was no “acquiring” and “target” company, as in a some “merger of equals” 
transactions in which a holding company structure is used. See LOU R. KLING & EILEEN NUGENT, 
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS 1-15 (2015) (describing such a 
structure). In such cases the first company listed in the notice provision was arbitrarily treated as the 
acquiring company.  
    43 See DAN GUSFIELD, ALGORITHMS ON STRINGS, TREES, AND SEQUENCES: COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 
COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 215-216 (1997). 
    44 See, e.g., Zhan Su; Byung-Ryul Ahn; Ki-Yol Eom; Min-Koo Kang; Jin-Pyung Kim; Moon-Kyun Kim, 
Plagiarism Detection Using the Levenshtein Distance and Smith-Waterman Algorithm, INTERNATIONAL J. 
NNOVATIVE COMPUTING INFORMATION AND CONTROL 569 (2008). 
into the other.45 The concept is very similar to what is displayed when one document is 
“blacklined” or “redlined” against another document. Thus, this process is similar to 
blacklining documents against one another (about 77 million times) and looking for those 
blacklines with the fewest edits. The word-for-word comparisons of 77 million pairs of 
documents requires substantial computing resources, so we used certain techniques to 
speed the comparisons.46 
 
We focus our analysis on pairs of documents with edit distance of less than 75% (i.e., 
pairs that are more than 25% similar to each other). Although 25% similarity may not 
sound very similar, in fact it is quite unusual to find two merger agreements with greater 
similarity under the edit distance measure. The number of matches for any given 
agreement increases dramatically below 25% similarity, so similarity below this level is 
generally not meaningful. 
             
Descriptive Statistics          
The most striking feature of our initial analysis of merger agreements is the high 
degree of diversity both in terms of their textual provisions and their antecedent merger 
templates.  Although merger agreements are thought to have a great deal of substantive 
similarity, textually the vast majority of merger agreements have very little in common.  
Table I underscores the small degree of commonalities across merger agreements.  The 
                                                            
    45 See DAN GUSFIELD, ALGORITHMS ON STRINGS, TREES, AND SEQUENCES: COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 
COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 215-216 (1997). 
   46 Specifically, we compressed the documents by eliminating the 500 most common words in the dataset 
from each agreement. This approach reduced the total amount of text in the average agreement by 
approximately 50%, but had almost no effect on the accuracy of the computations. This “compressed” 
version of the documents produced pairwise distance comparisons that correlated at .953 with the original 
documents in the range of distances we examine (greater than 20% similarity). 
mean degree of similarity among documents is 19.5% (7.4% on the compressed scale), 
and the median degree of similarity is 19.9% (7.8% on the compressed scale).  Thus, only 
a tiny fraction of agreements “match” (similarity of 25% or more on the compressed 
scale). Indeed, 99.76% of individual pairs of agreements are less than 25% similar on the 
compressed scale.  This fact suggests that there is remarkable heterogeneity in merger 
agreements in spite of the fact that all of these agreements deal with the same general 
type of transaction and each agreement begins with a precedent acquisition agreement 
from an earlier deal.    
 
Table I. Similarity distribution of the data. 
 Full Documents Compressed Documents 
More than 30% Similar 0.5% <0.1% 
25-30% Similar 3.8% 0.1% 
20-25% Similar 44.7% 0.2% 
15-20% Similar 40.3% 1.4% 
10-15% Similar 7.4% 15.3% 
Less than 10% Similar 3.4% 83% 
Median 19.9% 7.4% 
Mean 19.5% 7.8% 
*Based on sample of 50,000 random comparisons drawn from the documents. The 
correlation between the compressed distances and the full document distances was .953 
in the range of our analysis (greater than 25% similarity). 
 
III.  An Empirical Take on Transactional Practice 
Our method was able to identify a clear precedent deal for most of the agreements 
in the dataset. This fact means that most merger agreements were copied from another 
merger agreement that served as a template. The fact that we can identify the sources of 
merger agreements means that we can also observe the changes that were made in the 
drafting process, something previously only known to the drafters themselves. Thus, 
using this data we are able to empirically derive systematic conclusions about 
transactional legal practice that were previously based only on extrapolation of lawyers’ 
personal experience. 
 
We are interested in using this information to address three main questions. First, 
how are precedent documents chosen by lawyers? What are the factors that lead toward 
the decision to use a particular agreement as a model rather than another? Second, what 
are the changes that are made from the precedent to the draft? How many edits are made 
and why types of edits are made? Is text that was contained in the precedent document 
inadvertently retained in the new draft? Third, how do these documents evolve over time? 
 
The conventional wisdom would predict four principal criteria on which law firms 
are likely to choose precedents. First, law firms are more likely to choose precedents 
from past deals in which the same firm was involved.47 Second, law firms are more likely 
to choose precedents from past deals in the same or a related industry.48 Third, law firms 
are more likely to prefer more recent precedents to older ones.49 Fourth, law firms are 
more likely to prefer precedents from similar deal structures (e.g., cash versus stock 
consideration, merger of equals versus acquisition, strategic versus financial acquisition, 
etc.).50 We investigate each of these assumptions empirically below.    
                                                            
   47 See, e.g., Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 659-60 (2001) 
(discussing “familiarity bias” which tilts decision-making in favor of contexts of existing knowledge, rather 
than exploring what is optimal) 
   48 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Friesen et al., Price Trends and Patterns in Technical Analysis: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Examination, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1089, 1099 (2009) (discussing “representativeness 
bias,” the tendency to choose related samples as representative, which in the merger agreement context 
leads lawyers to choose precedents from the same industry).   
   49  See, e.g., MICHAEL M. POMPIAN, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND WEALTH MANAGEMENT 216-27(2006) 
(discussing “recency bias,” the tendency to emphasize more recent contexts than those that occurred during 
earlier periods).   
   50 See, e.g., THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 10-11 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the 
differences in design of a range of types of merger and acquisition deal structures).   
 First, we examine the identity law firms of involved in the precedent deal and 
each law firm’s role in the precedent transaction compared to their identities and roles in 
the current transaction.  Table II illustrates the counts for each category.      
           
Table II. Role of each law firm in precedent deal. 
 Represented acquirer 
in precedent deal 
Represented target in 
precedent deal 
Not involved in 
precedent deal 
Acquirer firm’s role 
in precedent deal 
1488 171 1132 
Target firm’s role in 
precedent deal 
174 499 2046 
    
The results provide strong empirical confirmation of the conventional wisdom 
among deal lawyers. The largest number of precedents are ones in which the same law 
firm represented the acquirer in both deals.  The conventional wisdom suggests that the 
acquirer’s counsel chooses the precedent, and the acquirer’s counsel prefers a precedent 
in which the acquirer’s counsel represented the acquirer.  Our data confirms this pattern 
of behavior. One reason for this is that acquirer’s counsel are frequently repeat players 
for the same acquirer client in which case they heavily borrow both substantive and firm-
specific provisions related to their client from an earlier precedent. The pattern is evident 
even when repeat acquirers are excluded, however, suggesting other reasons.              
 
We next examine the industry of the company that filed the precedent document 
compared to the industry of the company that filed the current document. The industry is 
given by the (3-digit) SIC codes attached to the party that filed the agreement.51 
 
                                                            
   51 In some cases the filer is the acquiring company and in some cases it is the target company. 
 Table III. Industry in precedent deal. 
 All 3 Digit SIC 
Codes 
Non-Banking 3 Digit 
SIC Codes 
Banking 3 Digit SIC 
Codes 
Same SIC Code 3407 (32.7%) 2675 (28.3%) 732 (75%) 
Different SIC Code 7010 (67.3%) 6768 (71.7%) 242 (24.8%) 
 
The “All 3 Digit SIC Codes” column of Table III reveals that although there is 
some preference for drawing a precedent from the same SIC code, agreements are often 
(even usually) copied from precedent documents from other industries. When 
commercial banking deals are excluded (SIC codes beginning with 602), the preference 
for the same industry is even weaker, at only 28%. The “Banking” column reveals, 
however, that this pattern is flipped in commercial banking (SIC codes beginning with 
602), where the vast majority (75%) of precedents are drawn from within commercial 
banking. It appears that the industry of the precedent document is highly relevant for the 
banking industry, but not very relevant for precedent selection in other industries.52  
While we do not have conclusive evidence to explain the higher degree of same-industry 
precedents for commercial banking deals, the most plausible explanation is the high 
degree of regulation of the financial industry which requires more specialized industry-
specific provisions.53 
  
                                                            
   52 This figure may reflect some bias in favor of finding differences between banking and other industries. 
This is because almost all banking combinations are between banking companies. Thus, the SIC code will 
be a banking SIC code whether the filer is the acquiring company or the target company. 
   53 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, R. Glenn Hubbard, & Darius Palia, The Political Economy of 
Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance, 39 J.L. & ECON. 667, 668-69 (1996) (discussing how 
commercial banks are subject to a high degree of regulation in virtually all countries).  
We next investigate the age of the precedents that firms use using the dates on 
which our agreements were filed.  We would expect firms to favor precedent documents 
drafted more recently than those drafted longer in the past. The age of precedent 
documents used gives some indication of how quickly language obsolesces. The 
following chart shows the distribution of how old the precedents are relative to the 
resulting document.   
 
 
The median number of days between a document and its precedent is 423.5, 
meaning that the median precedent document is just over a year old. This reflects a fairly 
strong preference for more recent precedents. Precedents more than three years old are 
very unusual, suggesting a high perceived rate of obsolescence of contract text. 
 
We now examine how many edits drafters make between the precedent document 
and the resulting document. Figure 2 below shows the percentage textual similarity 
between documents and their precedents. 
 
 
  The Figure reveals that documents are quite heavily edited during the drafting 
process. Although the degree of editing from precedent to final document varies widely, 
the largest number of documents share about 50% textual similarity to their precedents. 
Although there are a handful of documents with more than 80% similarity to the 
underlying precedents, most of those are repeat acquisitions for the same acquiring 
company. 
 
These figures allow us to make rough estimates of the time lawyers are investing 
in making edits throughout the drafting and negotiation process.  The median number of 
word edits between a precedent and a document is 21,866, meaning that in the typical 
drafting process approximately 22,000 words are deleted or inserted in documents that 
are typically about 27,000 words in length.  This fact suggests a remarkable level of 
editorial churning takes place throughout the drafting process and underscores the lack of 
standardization even within a given firm.   
          
The results suggest the possibility of excessive editing of the precedent and the 
final document. It is possible for heavy editing to be necessary between documents 
because of relevant differences between the two deals, but it is also possible that the 
heavy editing results from inefficient precedent selection and document design. We 
explore these topics in more detail below, first by building “family trees” of merger 
agreement lineages in Part IV, then by examining the relationships among these family 
lineages in Part V. 
IV. A Phylogenetic Tree of Merger Agreements     
The analysis above suggests that drafts diverge significantly from their precedent 
documents, with approximately 50% of the text edited. This fact does not fully answer 
the question of whether agreements are based off standard forms, because it is possible 
for documents based off the same standard form to differ significantly if the forms have a 
large number of variable text or “blanks.” To answer the question of whether standard 
forms underlie these documents, therefore, we need to examine the network of precedent 
documents. 
  
Because agreements are created by duplicating a “parent” agreements with edits, 
we argue that a genetic evolutionary analogy offers the best way to understand the 
creation and dispersion of legal language in transactional documents. Envisioning legal 
language as a form of “DNA” of transactions, we use computer textual analysis to 
identify the likely ancestors and descendants of each agreement, allowing us to build the 
equivalent of a phylogenetic tree of thousands of agreements.54 Techniques originally 
developed for analyzing genetic sequences have been applied in a variety of textual 
contexts, such as in the analysis of historical manuscripts copied by scribes.55 
        
The fact that we can identify likely precedent documents means that we can 
answer several types of questions that were previously impossible to analyze. For 
example, how many “lines” or “versions” of agreement forms are there?  To what extent 
do we witness evolutionary dead ends in terms of precedent lineage through a selection 
process?  To what extent is their convergent evolution among different lines of 
precedents as they incorporate standardized provisions?  To what extent is there 
speciation as precedent lines split or evolve into different versions? 
        
 The network of relationships of the agreements shows that there is no one 
“ancestor” of all agreements, but rather a series of “lineages” that are clustered largely by 
                                                            
54 A phylogenetic tree is a statistical reconstruction of evolutionary relationships among organisms based 
on their genetic code. See MASATOSHI NEI AND SUDHIR KUMAR, MOLECULAR EVOLUTION AND 
PHYLOGENETICS 73 (2000). 
   55 Applying phylogenetic methods to text is an example of “phylomemetics,” applying evolutionary 
theory to explain other processes that incorporate aspects of both path development and change over time.  
See, e.g., Christopher J. Howe & Heather F. Windram, Phylomemetics—Evolutionary Analysis beyond the 
Gene, PLOS BIOL. May 2011; 9(5).        
law firm. The following three illustrative figures show precedent relationships for clusters 
of agreements dominated by particular law firms. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 represent Davis Polk, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Cooley LLP  
clusters, respectively. In each figure, documents are represented by the points and the 
lines connect the documents to their precedents. All three figures serve as evidence of 
many “lineages” of merger agreements, rather than clusters of agreements based off a 
form. However, Figures 3 and 4 have different characteristics from Figure 5, although the 
differences are somewhat subtle. In all three Figures, most agreements have at most one 
or two descendants, with only a handful having more than two. However, in Figures 3 
and 4, there are no “hubs” that account for a large portion of the total number of 
documents. In contrast, in the Cooley cluster, there is one very important hub that has 
dozens of descendants within a few generations. 
 
The Davis Polk and Sullivan & Cromwell networks suggest that standardized 
forms are not widely used within those firms, and that pattern is true of most firms we 
studied. Even in the Cooley example where forms do appear to be used, most of the 
agreements do not appear to stem from the form. The merger agreements appear to form 
precedent “lineages,” in which agreements strongly resemble other individual agreements 
rather than any apparent attempts to standardize acquisition agreements based on a 
standardized form. The result is that the text of each agreement reflects a somewhat 
idiosyncratic path-dependent process of evolution, rather than a standardized design from 
an industry-wide or even firm-specific standard form.   
 
       One striking finding is that standard form agreements are not widely used, even 
within a given firm.  At most firms appear to recycle precedent from a given client, but 
there is little consistency in acquisition agreements even within a given firm.  Instead, 
there are “lineages” of acquisition agreements that bear the fingerprints of their earlier 
progenitor precedents.  The lack of standardization even within firms suggests there are 
systematic inefficiencies to the precedent selection and acquisition agreement drafting 
process.                
      
This practice is illustrated rather dramatically with the case of the American Bar 
Association’s Model Merger Agreement for the Acquisition of a Public Company, 
published in 2011. This model agreement, drafted by the ABA’s Mergers and 
Acquisitions Committee's Subcommittee on the Acquisition of Public Companies, took 
over 15 years to produce with the contributions of hundreds of attorneys.56 If any 
industry-wide model could have the potential to standardize text in the public company 
market, the ABA’s Model Merger Agreement would be it. Our analysis reveals, however, 
that the text of the Model Merger Agreement has not been used as the basis for many 
negotiated merger agreements. Indeed, only one public company merger agreement in 
our data set of 12,000 mergers appears to have more than a 50% resemblance to the 
“model.”  
    
The problem is likely not with the Model Merger Agreement itself (as it is hard to 
imagine a more in-depth attempt at standardization), but with the culture and practice of 
mergers and acquisitions. A model agreement, no matter how carefully drafted, is not as 
appealing to practitioners as a negotiated document. 
 
Our analysis suggests the possibility of suboptimal precedent selection and 
inefficiently high levels of editing. One caveat to this conclusion is that each merger 
agreement is the product of the union of two or more law firms’ vision for the acquisition 
agreement. Each document therefore reflects at least a partial cross-fertilization of law 
                                                            
   56 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC 
COMPANY, at v (2011).   
firms’ approaches to drafting.57  While the acquirer’s counsel takes the lead and chooses 
the precedent, provisions or changes that the target’s counsel believes are integral will 
shape the evolution of the agreement.   Therefore, it is possible that a significant 
percentage of agreements reflect the melding of multiple “parent” sources into one. We 
address this possibility and its implications further in Part VI, below. 
   
V.  The Geometry of Merger Agreements 
The trends we have observed in merger agreement drafting can be thought of 
geometrically. We could imagine a spectrum of drafting that ranges from a completely 
standardized form on one end to a completely artisanal “craft” document on the other. 
One end of the spectrum is the pure fillable form that consists of fixed text (boilerplate) 
and variable text (blanks). Such pure forms (often referred to as adhesion contracts) are 
ubiquitous in small transactions in everyday commerce.58 In such cases, the pure form’s 
tenth descendant will not be much more distant from the original than will the ninth, 
eighth, seventh, or even the second. This is because each time the document is 
reproduced, the variable text is changed and the fixed text remains intact, meaning that 
the text overall does not drift much from the original.  Although such forms are perhaps 
most often associated with consumer transactions, they are not limited to that context. 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s Master Agreement serves as an 
                                                            
57 There is a rough analogy in the context of molecular evolution with the concept of horizontal gene 
transfer, in which genes are transferred not from parent to offspring but from one fully developed organism 
to another. See Carlos F. Amábile-Cuevas & Marina E. Chicurel, Horizontal Gene Transfer, 81 AMER. 
SCIENTIST 332 (1993). 
   58 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 296 (3rd ed. 1999) (explaining that “in routine transactions the 
typical agreement consists of a standard printed form that has been prepared by one party and assented to 
by the other with little or no opportunity for negotiation”).   
example of how a standardized set of terms can serve as a basic framework for hundreds 
of trillions of dollars of credit risk.59      
                       
On the other end of the spectrum is the “artisanal” model where there is no 
distinction between “fixed” and “variable” text—everything is negotiable.60 Although 
documents are created by copying precedents and therefore immediate descendants will 
bear a resemblance to their immediate ancestor, remote ancestors quickly become distant 
from even relatively recent ancestors.  When virtually all text in the agreement is 
negotiable, after many generations the text tends to drift quite far from its original 
moorings. Much legal drafting falls more in this category than the “fill-in-the-blanks” 
category.61  This type of random selection would foster rapid “speciation” of agreements 
but would also make it very difficult for any degree of standardization to develop. 
 
In theory, the degree of editing of variable text and the degree of standardization 
of the “fixed” text are separate. One could have a preprinted boilerplate form with many, 
many blanks but otherwise fixed text. One could also have a free-form agreement where 
there is no text but that hews closely to its precedent document. In practice, however, the 
number of edits and the percentage of fixed text is likely closely connected. Documents 
                                                            
   59 See, e.g., Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 677, 737 (discussing how the ISDA Master Agreement was the first widely used template for 
swaps); See ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 52-53 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing 
how the ISDA Master Agreement is one of the most broadly used standardized agreements).    
  60 See, e.g., Jacob M. Carpenter, Unique Problems and Creative Solutions to Assessing Learning 
Outcomes in Transactional Drafting Courses: Overcoming “The Form Book Problem,” 38 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 195, 199-200 (2012) (discussing the practical difficulties of starting off completely from scratch in 
drafting legal agreements).   
   61  See, e.g., SUSAN L. BRODY ET AL., LEGAL DRAFTING 3-5 (1994) (discussing “the myth that drafting is 
merely a fill-in-the-blank activity and explaining the context-specific nature of legal drafting).           
that are heavily edited from their precedents are likely to be completely negotiable, and 
documents that are lightly edited are likely to be mostly non-negotiable. 
   
                    
The empirical reality we observe in our dataset is far closer to the “artisanal” 
model than the “standardized form” model.  Figure 6 shows the distance from the original 
“ancestor” agreement in lineages that span ten or more generations. 
 
 
 
The slope of the line shows that the edits from one generation to another tend to 
accumulate, meaning that within a few generations the descendant bears much less 
similarity to its ancestor. The horizontal dashed line is the median similarity of randomly 
selected documents. Although after ten generations the median similarity to the ancestor 
remains higher than that of random documents, the graph shows fairly clearly that a 
document is not much more similar to its ancestor after ten generations than is a random 
document from the dataset. 
 
The data therefore show that lawyers not only make a significant number of 
changes while editing a document, but that those changes tend to persist in later 
generations of descendants of the document, resulting in a marked degree of “drift” from 
the original text. The high degree of changes from one “generation” of precedent to the 
next and the persistence of those changes over time suggests that lawyers are making 
little effort to standardize their agreements.   
  
The excessive editing, together with the other observations made above, reflects a 
further pathology in drafting—the precedent selection process. It appears that lawyers 
engage in little effort to identify agreements whose terms are most applicable to the 
challenges of a particular deal.  Instead, lawyers tend to choose very recent precedents 
from their own firms, rather than more applicable precedents that may be older or drafted 
by another firm. Thus, the haphazard precedent selection process appears to engender 
excessive editing, because an ill-fitting precedent will need substantial reworking to suit 
the needs of the transaction. 
 The likely reason for the precedent selection pathology is one that most 
transactional lawyers are familiar with: being tasked by a partner or senior associate to 
find an example from a firm’s data bases of a past set of deal documents and randomly 
selecting one of those deal documents to serve as a template. But if a firm had some 
standardization to its agreements, the firm’s standardized terms would still rise to the 
surface even from randomly selected agreement templates. 
 
The one exception to this rule is that lawyers appear to use merger agreement 
templates that involve the same client if the client is a repeat-player.  In such cases, the 
average similarity is generally over 70% from one transaction to another. But this finding 
only highlights the randomness in other cases. The fact that the same precedent can be 
adapted with relatively few changes from one target company to another suggests that the 
extensive edits are not “necessary” in other agreements.  The key difference is that in 
such cases, it is likely client pressure that disciplines the drafting process and keeps the 
draft document from differing markedly from its precedent.  Whether this repeat-player 
client pressure comes from in-house counsel expecting their earlier deals to serve as 
templates because of familiarity or demanding greater efficiency from their lawyers, the 
effect is the same in leading to a greater degree of repeat-player client standardization    
    
The irony is that indiscriminate copying from past merger actually leads to a large 
divergence in deal documents over time both because extraneous artifacts live on from 
one deal to another, and lawyers have to make more changes that may lead to a greater 
risk of error or poor drafting that raises risks for clients.  Both of these points underscore 
the desirability of a greater move towards standardization of acquisition agreements. We 
explore these facets of the analysis in Parts VI and VII, below. 
   
VI.  Implications 
This project represents a first step in understanding the role of precedents in the 
deal making process.  But our data analysis gives a clear picture of how precedents set 
the defaults for merger agreement negotiations.  The high degree of divergence of the 
final products from their precedent agreements highlights how the absence of 
standardization imposes a high cost on clients both in terms of higher billable hours from 
extensive edits and greater legal uncertainties from the absence of uniform language.    
 
We identify four costs that arise from the system of precedent selection that 
contribute to the inefficiencies of the drafting process. First, there is the cost of expending 
efforts to become familiar with deal documents.62  Paradoxically, the very cost of 
familiarity with a multiplicity of agreement forms is what sustains the multiplicity of 
agreement forms in the first place and thwarts standardization.63  Senior associate and 
junior partner deal lawyers do not have the luxury of time of determining which 
precedent is best, and instead are likely to start off looking at their own firm’s database of 
past deals.  Even to the extent more senior lawyers are involved in the selection of deal 
                                                            
62 Cf. Brian J. Broughman & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware’s Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273 
(2015) (discussing how familiarity with Delaware law reduces transaction costs and conversely how 
switching to another state governance regime would significantly raise transaction costs).     
63 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 
83 VA. L. REV. 713, 727-29 (1997) (discussing the significant impact of switching costs on corporate 
contracting).     
documents, they are likely to choose deal templates that they are familiar with, rather 
than to invest the time and energy in figuring out what previous agreement would be best 
suited for the needs of their clients.64 The precedent selection process therefore inhibits 
the ability to standardize agreements.     
     
This cost should not be understated as lawyers are focused on their immediate 
needs and do not have the luxury of becoming familiar with the diverse array of 
acquisition agreements that are publicly available. Transactional lawyers frequently 
scramble to start a deal on short notice and lack incentives to do more than the bare 
minimum to select a plausible precedent from their firm’s database.  Whenever possible, 
they would likely start and end their search on precedent that relate to their acquirer 
client.  Their search also would be limited to deal documents within their law firm. While 
each merger agreement reflects a degree of cross-fertilization between firms through the 
back-and-forth of drafting edits, this focus on a law firm’s own agreements also hinders 
the potential for standardized deal documents to emerge.      
     
Second, because lawyers choose documents they are familiar with they likely 
expend more resources than necessary to adapt a familiar draft to a new situation..  
Simply put, lawyers may have the natural tendency to choose past deals they have 
worked on for precedents, rather than choosing precedent that is more on point for the 
industry or particular challenges of a given deal.  This will result increased drafting 
efforts for both sides of the transaction and will lead to higher costs for the client.  These 
                                                            
64 See, e.g., Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 659-60 (2001) 
(discussing “familiarity bias” which tilts decision-making in favor of contexts of existing knowledge, rather 
than exploring what is optimal). 
costs could be mitigated through the selection of precedent that was more on point for the 
situation.   
 
The third related point is that there are a host of residual costs from imperfect 
familiarity.  Lawyers replicate the same type of precedent selection inefficiencies from 
deal to deal which thwarts any move towards standardization even within firms.  This 
point raises the concern that agreement lineages within a given firm may reflect the 
default choices of the partner or senior associate in charge of the initial template 
selection, rather than any more cogent selection process.    
 
Lastly, there is the residual cost of an “estopped” bargaining position. The 
absence of standardized acquisition agreements means that the acquirer’s counsel has 
incentives to use precedent selection as a tool to create leverage vis-à-vis the seller’s 
counsel.  Because the target’s counsel cannot easily push back and demand sweeping 
changes in negotiations, acquirer’s counsel have incentives to use non-standardized terms 
that stack the deck in favor of their clients.65   The net result is that deal terms are highly 
path dependent in ways that thwart standardization and heighten the inefficiencies of the 
M&A process. 
      
The irony of the strategic value of framing the negotiations is that individual law 
firms may have not standardized firm-specific merger agreements in a systematic way in 
order to gain a greater advantage over the counsel of target companies.  The logic may be 
                                                            
65 See, e.g., DAVID C. BURGESS ET AL., DRAFTING BUSINESS CONTRACTS §1.21 (2015) (discussing the 
limitations lawyers face in suggesting revisions to a draft).    
that too high a degree of standardization would make it easier for repeat-player target 
counsel to anticipate and blunt key provisions of firm-specific agreements.  
Standardization also would reduce barriers to entry to competitors that could erode the 
market share of leading firms as there is no intellectual property barrier to copying 
another firm’s merger agreement template.  As importantly, even though greater firm-
specific standardization might improve firms’ bargaining position, the tradeoff of 
foregone billable hours might pose too stark a tradeoff.  Here, industry-wide 
standardization could help to resolve the prisoner’s dilemma faced by the acquirer’s 
counsel.   
      
The fact that precedents appear chosen primarily for familiarity to the acquirer’s 
counsel underscores the significant costs to becoming familiar with a precedent. Since 
precedents appear chosen primarily for familiarity rather than deal isomorphism, there is 
a strong case to be made for creating a lingua franca among deal lawyers by developing a 
model acquisition agreement form.  This approach would dramatically reduce the costs of 
becoming familiar with precedents and focus lawyers on deal-specific issues rather than 
being caught up in a game of path development and wasteful haggling among firms.    
    
A related point is that the legal details of merger agreements do not appear to 
have much, if any, salience to financial markets.66 Instead, markets appear to value the 
reputational intermediary role and the due diligence role that transactional lawyers 
                                                            
66 See Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1145-
48 (2013). 
provide.67  This fact reinforces the case for standardization as there does not appear to be 
any significant market value to law firm’s idiosyncratic process of selecting and tweaking 
precedents.  The use of a standardized master agreement would also have the added value 
of facilitating the creation of a body of precedent to build up interpreting standard 
agreements as a whole.  Courts in Delaware and elsewhere could more easily scrutinize 
deviations from a standard form, which over time would lead to greater legal certainty 
and reduced transaction costs.      
 
VII. Steering Law Firms or Their Clients Toward Standardization 
 Our goal for this study is to point out the inefficiencies of the deal design process 
to motivate lawyers to move towards either firm-specific standardization or the broader 
development of industry standard deal agreements. Greater standardization would help 
clients by reducing the costs of transactions as well as by reducing the uncertainties 
created by myriads of ad hoc edits by lawyers.68  Moves towards greater standardization 
would help lawyers by creating a lingua franca of default provisions that could be 
authoritatively interpreted by courts.69  Even if leading firms developed firm-specific 
standard agreements, it would foster greater fluency.70  Law firms would be better 
                                                            
67 Id. at 1147-48.   
68 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting 
(Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-27 (1997) (discussing how standardization 
enhances efficiency, reduces uncertainty, and lowers costs); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate 
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 759-67 (1995) (describing how shifts towards greater 
standardization reduces both legal and uncertainty costs). 
69 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286-88 (1985) 
(discussing the range of benefits from broad familiarity and use of standardized terms).          
70 See, e.g., Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form 
Contracts, 167 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 30 (2011) (explaining how moves towards greater use of 
standard form documents reduces reading costs and enhances fluency among users). 
positioned to negotiate of behalf of their clients by focusing on the substantively distinct 
issues to each deal rather than repeatedly redrafting the same provisions. 
    
 The principal barriers to standardization are not the obvious ones of upfront costs.  
It is true that assembling a standardized merger agreement form for a particular firm 
entails a substantial investment of upfront, unbillable time and energy and would produce 
a work product that other firms could easily mimic.  But we have strong anecdotal 
evidence that such “forms initiatives” are common within law firms despite these 
obstacles.71 The problem appears to be that such form initiatives are generally 
unsuccessful because lawyers tend not to use the forms. The attorney creating a document 
under time pressure tends to start with the precedent that is most familiar, rather than the 
one that is most standardized. The result is that the documents drift farther and farther 
over time as edits accumulate across generations. 
 
 The individual habits of precedent selection could be overcome by strong pressure 
from law firm leaders, but they have little incentive to undertake the expense of such 
initiatives. Although the long-term benefits to clients and the lawyers themselves may be 
significant, lawyers would likely suffer from the same short-term myopia that leads to 
increased complexity of computer programs in the software context.72  Risking the 
economic model of transactional law for speculative long-term gains from a standardized 
merger agreement template would likely represent an unacceptable trade off.  The lack of 
                                                            
71 Many law firms have collected sample forms for transactional drafting which are available on their 
intranet sites, and therefore not accessible for citation.   
72 Many concepts in software development are analogous to this problem, such as the “law of increasing 
entropy” as applied to software. See L.A Belady & M.M. Lehman, A Model of Large Program 
Development, IBM SYSTEMS J. 225, 228 (1976) (proposing the “law of increasing entropy” as applied to 
software). 
industry-wide standards has the indirect effect of creating having barriers to entry into the 
merger and acquisition legal practice since a small number of law firms dominate the 
market.73   The costs of enforcing standards would be borne by firms undertaking the 
initiatives, while the benefits to standardization would be a public good.74 
                        
 The reluctance to use industry-wide precedents is a strong cultural norm within 
law firms. Many large firms have strong cultural norms that their own work product is 
superior to that of other firms, leading to distrust of forms drafted by others.  Our data 
illustrates this point dramatically through the fact that the ABA Model Merger 
Agreement, which is the product of many years of work by prominent specialists, has 
been almost completely ignored as a source of precedent.75 We would be naïve not to 
note, however, that this cultural norm serves to further the self-interest of the incumbents 
in large law firm practice. Deal lawyers benefit from inefficiency in the drafting process 
which generates billable hours, and therefore they would not have an economic incentive 
to invest non-billable hours into creating templates for deal agreements.76            
 
 Because the law firm industry itself may not have the appropriate incentives to 
create standardized text, the next best strategy would be to seek to shame deal lawyers 
                                                            
73 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 93, 107 (Spring 1994) (arguing that firms with good reputations or large existing networks tend to 
oppose standardization even if it benefits the firm, while firms with smaller networks or weaker reputations 
tend to favor moves towards standardization to level the playing field).    
74 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of 
Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 310-12 (2003) (discussing how firms are 
understandably reluctant to invest in the creation of standards that may lower the barriers to entry for 
competition).       
75 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
76 See, e.g., Leslie Larkin Cooney, Walking the Legal Tightrope, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 421, 435-36 (2010) 
(discussing how the billable hour rewards inefficiency by creating a conflict of interest between attorneys 
who are compensated based on time and clients who are solution-oriented).     
into addressing the inefficiencies of the drafting process.  Shaming is a challenging 
strategy because lawyers are notorious both for their dearth of shame and the zeal with 
which they point to technicalities to justify their actions.77   For this reason highlighting 
the shortcomings of M&A lawyers writ large for fostering inefficiency in deal drafting 
would have little chance of shaming lawyers into moving towards standardization.  
Lawyers may be quick to point to the intangibles of the drafting process, or they may pin 
the blame on the intrinsic challenges of negotiating across firms that require back-and-
forth nitpicking.  Either way lawyers are remarkably skilled at externalizing 
responsibility or coming up with excuses for problems that they dismiss as systemic.   
      
  Our analysis anticipates the ability of lawyers to deflect collective blame.  For 
this reason we focus on leading law firms both to highlight the degree to which individual 
law firms have failed to develop standardized templates for deals, as well as to focus our 
shaming efforts on firms who have more to lose from scrutiny.  This strategy rests on 
sounder footing because the leading M&A firms act as reputational intermediaries.  The 
value of their advice and their above-market pricing for their services turns on their 
reputations as gold standards of the industry for deal-making.  Because M&A advising is 
a significant part of law firm’s overall rankings, leading firms may be particularly 
vulnerable to transparency that highlights their inefficiencies in drafting.  Our approach 
allows the ranking of law firms based on the degree to which they appear to be engaging 
in editorial churning, creating the potential to highlight the relative dysfunction of the 
drafting process.    
                                                            
77 See JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 5-11 (2013) (discussing the decline in 
reputational constraints on Wall Street actors and financial intermediaries). 
     
 One problem with this more focused shaming strategy is that leading M&A firms 
benefit from the elastic nature of reputation.78  Since leading M&A firms are trusted 
advisors with longstanding reputations in the field, it would be difficult to erode the faith 
that clients place in their services even in the face of evidence of editorial churning which 
increases billable hours.  For this reason we seek to appeal to the self-interest of clients to 
move towards standardization.  Clients who are involved in only occasional mergers and 
acquisitions may have every reason to look past the bills and focus on the reputational 
imprimatur that a leading law firm conveys.  They may wrongfully believe in the 
overstatement that each deal has to be carefully tailored to meet the specifics of the 
clients.  While deal-specific provisions are important, lawyers can stretch the deal-
specific dimension of deals into a justification for billable efforts that could easily be 
supplanted by standardized terms.         
    
The hope is that clients who are repeat players in the M&A context would have 
the economic incentive and ability to scrutinize their lawyers’ work product and to 
overcome the self-interest and lack of shame of deal lawyers.79   Large institutional 
clients such as the Carlyle Group or other private equity firms would have the leverage 
and the economic incentive to push for standardized acquisition agreements to reduce 
their overhead costs.  The in-house counsel at private equity firms would be in the 
position to appreciate the inefficiencies of the process (since they generally have started 
                                                            
78 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into 
the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 320-22 (1985) (discussing 
the stickiness of law firms’ reputations).    
79 See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575, 1581-82 (2013) 
(discussing the greater monitoring potential of repeat players).   
out on the other side of the process as associates or partners for outside counsel).  Since 
private equity firms are repeat players, their in-house counsel could at minimum demand 
client-specific standardization which could form a building block towards greater 
standardization across deals.   
         
The problem may be that even though the costs of M&A lawyers appear high, 
they are still only a small fraction of the cost of M&A transactions.80  This fact may 
explain why in-house counsel at institutional clients have not invested energy and time in 
pushing for greater acquisition agreement standardization (or have not sought transaction-
based pricing which could create similar incentives for standardization within a given 
firm).  A related challenge is that since in-house counsel at private equity firm are 
generally trained by elite law firms, they may accept inefficient drafting as a natural part 
of the process since that’s what they (likely) did when they were partners and senior 
associates.  The general counsel of private equity firm likely choose their outside counsel 
based on preexisting company-specific and/or individual relationships and may not have 
the economic interest to extract greater value from their law firms by pushing for intra-
firm standardization of deal documents.  But highlighting the inefficiencies of the 
drafting process may give general counsel the tools they need to push for standardized 
deal templates that reduce the risk that law firms will reinvent the wheel for each 
transaction through editorial churning.  The fact that merger agreements for repeat-player 
clients have a significantly higher degree of overlap (approximately seventy percent) 
suggests the plausibility of this strategy.  If repeat-player private equity firms were 
                                                            
80 See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 6, at 241-42 (discussing how businesspeople often view 
lawyering costs as a transaction cost which amounts to only a small percentage of the deal).     
presented with more clear evidence of the degree of editorial churning, this fact would 
give them a powerful tool to push for greater firm-specific standardization and efficiency 
in the drafting process.      
     
The push for a standardized agreement may be difficult given how a small coterie 
of law firms dominate the M&A market who may enjoy their lucratively inefficient 
ways.81  But it is not unprecedented for standardized agreements to arise when there is 
broad consensus for the desirability for standardized terms and legal certainty in spite of 
the practice of ad hoc drafting.  For example, credit agreements with banks typically 
follow a standardized forms which reduces risk and uncertainty for the banking 
industry.82      
 
What may be missing is a trade association or other standard setting organization 
who could represent the interests of corporate clients in having standardized forms.  This 
type of standard-setting organization has arisen in other contexts where all parties 
involved would benefit from standardization.83  While the American Bar Association’s 
Model Agreement ostensibly represents the work product and interest of American 
lawyers as a whole, it does not represent the interests of the clients of lawyers who are far 
more likely to have an economic interest in standardization.  This fact may help to 
explain why the ABA’s Model Merger Agreement has been largely ignored as the 
                                                            
81 See, e,g., BLOOMBERG, GLOBAL M&A MARKET REVIEW LEGAL RANKINGS, at 4-5 (2015), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/content/uploads/sites/4/Bloomberg-1H-2015-MA-Legal-League-
Tables.pdf (detailing the dominance of the M&A market by a small number of elite law firms).      
82 See, e.g., KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL 
CHALLENGES 59-60 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the standardization of credit agreements).     
83 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 255, 280 (1998) (using the example of the development of cross-border securitizations as an 
illustration of how private sector firms can have convergent incentives both to innovate and standardize).   
primary beneficiaries were not involved in the drafting of the Model Merger Agreement 
and have failed to pressure their lawyers to adopt this template.  The leading law firms 
that dominate M&A activity have therefore had little interest in embracing the Model 
Merger Agreement in their drafting.  
 
 In contrast, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) is a 
clear example of how self-interest can fuel standardization.  ISDA’s membership did not 
consist solely of service providers, but rather represented a cross section of end users of 
derivatives, such as financial institutions, who had much to gain financially from reduced 
transaction costs and greater legal uncertainty form the standardization of derivatives.84  
As a result, standardized swaps and derivatives agreements have become the staple for 
the industry which offer a clear template, but also provide for flexibility to adjust the 
terms to meet the needs of the counterparties in each swap or derivative transaction.85 
Private equity firms could similarly band together to champion standardized acquisition 
agreements that would mitigate the inefficiencies of the M&A process. 
 
Similarly, industry groups and trade associations may have both the economic 
interest and collective interest to push for greater standardization of other types of 
transactional documents.  Document standardization has emerged on a large-scale in the 
                                                            
84 See https://www2.isda.org/membership/member-types/ (providing an overview of the membership of 
ISDA). 
85 See, e.g., Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 677, 737 (discussing how the ISDA Master Agreement was the first widely used template for swaps); 
See ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 52-53 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing how the 
ISDA Master Agreement is one of the most broadly used standardized agreements).    
low-end of the transactional world,86 and the key would be identifying and motivating 
industry groups with the stakes and leverage to bring standardization to the higher end of 
the transactional legal drafting process. The development of new technologies may play 
the largest role. Indeed, our approach itself, by allowing lawyers to see the evolutionary 
history of a particular document may have the ability to discipline drafting.      
 
The critique of this approach is that it may be too much to hope that self-interest 
could erode an entrenched practice of inefficient precedent selection and deal making.  
Trade associations and other industry groups are most effective when the stakes for their 
industry are high, and the industry is united in pushing for statutory or regulatory 
changes.  While all companies, and in particular private equity companies, would benefit 
from greater standardization of deal documentation, the benefit may be small enough that 
it will be difficult to motivate industry groups to pressure law firms to change their 
inefficient ways.       
 
The more modest strategy would be to seek to reinvigorate the ABA’s Model 
Merger Agreement or to enlist another legal body to forge a model acquisition agreement 
that could serve as a reference point amidst the current sea of distinctive acquisition 
agreements.  The textual analysis used in this study can serve as a tool towards this end.  
It would be plausible to identify substantive provisions that are consistent with a large 
cross section of acquisition agreements that could form a foundation for a model 
agreement.  The logic of this approach is that it may be difficult to induce leading law 
                                                            
86 See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract 
Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 330-34 (2010) (discussing the development of standard forms 
and contracts for low-end transactions).     
firms to work together to forge a standardized merger agreement (that they are likely to 
embrace) either through shame or external pressure.  But it may be easier to work 
backward from existing merger agreements to put together a standardized merger 
agreement that reflects both common terms and the best practices of the industry.  A 
synthesis of the best practices from existing merger agreements would not necessarily 
change the drafting process at law firms.  But it would equip clients with a greater tool to 
push back against editorial churning and to demand explanations for why the terms of an 
agreement differ from the model agreement.                              
Conclusion 
By constructing lineages of acquisition agreements we will seek to capture for the 
first time a picture of the complexity and opaqueness of the transactional drafting 
process.  This study has shown the role of path dependency in the evolution of merger 
agreements and highlighted the resulting inefficiencies from the precedent selection and 
drafting process.  The result is that the acquisition agreement a client ends up with 
depends heavily on the path the agreement took to get there.   
 
This idiosyncratic process and results highlight the need for greater 
standardization of acquisition agreements.  The nature of merger negotiations necessarily 
entails extensive negotiations to resolve deal-specific issues and uncertainties involving 
the target and acquirer.  But creating standardized acquisition agreement templates would 
facilitate a focus on deal-specific issues.  It would also reduce the often wasteful process 
of firms’ haggling over the use of precedents and tinkering with legal provisions whose 
meaning has been conclusively established through past legal and judicial interpretations.  
Standardized forms would not inhibit innovation, but rather would focus the energy of 
lawyers on justifying departures from standard provisions and explaining how changes 
would add value to their client or to both parties in a transaction.   
 
                     
